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SUBJECT : National Policy on Counterintelligence
and the Establishment of a Committee
to Implement such Policy

3. I concur in the view expressed by the Secretary of Defense that our security requires the most effective utilization of all United States counterintelligence capabilities. The protection of important American overseas military installations and personnel requires that we exercise the utmost vigilance and coordinate our actions to provide against espionage and infiltration by a potential enemy.

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4. The objectives sought can, I believe, be more rapidly and efficiently achieved by using existing machinery for the task rather than by creating still another inter-departmental committee and staff.

5. Counterintelligence or counterespionage is a segment of intelligence operations. It is impossible properly to counter a potential enemy's action without positive intelligence as to his intentions, capabilities and techniques. In the Intelligence Advisory Committee we now have a coordinating mechanism in the foreign intelligence field. To strip that Committee of its jurisdiction over foreign counterintelligence and to form a new body for this purpose, would create unnecessary and confusing duplication. If the new committee, as is apparently contemplated, should undertake to enter into relations with intelligence and security services abroad, parallel with the relationships which have been maintained with these services for many years, it would prejudice existing foreign intelligence liaison activities. Such relationships are not susceptible of committee management.

6. Membership on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with two exceptions, is practically identical with that proposed for the new committee. Elements of the Department of Defense are represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee by the Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Except for the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force, these are also responsible for the direction of counterintelligence matters in their respective Departments. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense is not normally represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force could be invited to join with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever counterintelligence policies and operational coordination matters are under consideration.

7. If the Secretary of Defense considers that the present charter of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is not adequate for the purposes he has in mind, I should be glad to receive and submit to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for its consideration any proposed amendments to the present directives. I am confident that the foregoing procedure would accomplish the Secretary of Defense's

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objectives in the most expeditious, efficient, economical and secure manner.

8. I am submitting this report in my capacity as Director of Central Intelligence and not as Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. It would seem to be the appropriate procedure in a matter of this nature, affecting the entire structure of intelligence coordination, for proposals to be considered by the Intelligence Advisory Committee before, not after, their formalization and submission to the National Security Council.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

O/DCI:LKT:mfb 4 June 57

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